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Abstract 
 
Despite severe economic turmoil within the last decade the stock diagnosis for most market 
insufficiencies has been: the state must be “slimmed down”. Satisfying social needs through 
the free market under the slogan of “less government is good government” has been a 
constitutive feature of economic policy since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s. But even 
as the deregulation of the markets and the “downsizing” of the state causes growing social 
turbulences – especially in the context of the current financial and economic meltdown – 
politicians, scholars and the media still cling to the idea of an omnipotent market. Deep-
rooted and widely-spread anti-statism still fulfils the role of a creed serving to legitimize the 
necessity of market-centred “reforms”. 
 
JEL classification: A11, B22, B26, L3, N20, P16 
 
Keywords: anti-statism, free-market economy, laissez-faire, lean state, liberalism, 
neoliberalism, Mont Pèlerin Society 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the commercialization of the grain trade in late-nineteenth-century Chicago it has been 
common knowledge that the impact of market forces is nowhere more effective, and 
sometimes fateful, than on the floors of the exchanges. But – as governments all over the 
world implement packages costing billions to save distressed companies, reassure anxious 
citizens and prevent their economies from sliding into the worst calamity since the Great 
Depression of 1929-32 – it is still strange to find the erstwhile advocates of largely de-
regulated and unfettered capital transactions suddenly demanding a strong state to take 
matters in hand. Governments of all colours acquired stakes in the former giants of the 
financial world: Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan in New York, RBS and Lloyds/HBOS in 
London, Dexia and Fortis in Brussels. 
 
This development represents quite a U-turn, given that for more than a quarter century the 
“control deficits of the state and within the state” have been endlessly reiterated and the 
benefits of the “lean state” held high (Jänicke 1993: 65). Under that logic state interventions 
to correct market outcomes or overall economic planning to pursue society-wide or social 
policy aims cannot be anything other than alien interference. For numerous liberals such 
interventions represent a “usurpation of knowledge” that ultimately ends in totalitarianism 
(Hayek 1975). But although the current tempest in the international capital markets now 
causes even the “market believers” to cease their public demands for “humility before the 
market’s unpredictability” (Hayek 2001: 47), anti-statism must still be regarded as an 
immensely influential intellectual current whose principles and tenets define the international 
frame of reference for social and economic policy. Thus the transformation of the Keynesian 
welfare state into a “Schumpeterian workfare state” (Jessop 1993) in pursuit of a supposedly 
urgent need to secure international competitiveness continues unabated in most developed 
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industrial states. From a political-economy perspective, this article tries to expose an array of 
the most persistent historical arguments for slimming down governmental influence.  
 
 
Hegemony of Anti-Statism 
 
In order to understand the role of the state in neoliberalism it is worth taking a look back at its 
origins. The term “neoliberalism” was coined at the Colloque Walter Lippmann, held in 
August 1938 in Paris (Walpen 2000: 1068). But it was another half a century before the 
neoliberal doctrine was able to establish itself as the predominant paradigm of political 
economy. First under Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States 
and subsequently in most of the states of continental Europe there has been – in Gramscian 
terms – a “counter-reformation”. Ideas of the welfare state, pillars of public services and 
historically evolved sectors of state economic activity that had once been matters of public 
consensus came under a barrage of criticism from all sides. Although the concrete details of 
the neoliberal societal model remained vague for a long time, its ambitions were quickly 
apparent. Even before aforementioned colloquium of 1938, the French economic theorist 
Louis Rougiers wrote to William E. Rappard that the declared goal was to set in motion “an 
international crusade for a constructive liberalism” (Walpen 2000: 1071). At the latest by the 
end of the “short century” as Eric Hobsbawm named the era of “real existing socialism” from 
1917 to 1989 (1995: 20), the efforts of the neoliberal think tanks and conservative free-market 
media to implement market doctrine not only as the roadmap for efficient economic policy 
but also as the solution to social andecological ills had been rewarded. For two decades now 
the very tangible and visible outcome has been a widely accepted dominance of neoliberal 
political models: “Neoliberalism is now perceived as the all-purpose panacea to address 
economic and social ills” (Pasha 2000: 71; Mitrović 2005). 
 
If we are not satisfied with the stated claims of the authors of neoliberal economic and 
societal concepts and their concrete implementation, but instead search for an explanation for 
the victorious march of neoliberalism, deeper questions have to be answered: What were the 
driving forces that helped neoliberal economic policy to achieve its breakthrough in society, 
i.e. to achieve acceptance across the obvious traditional (party) political boundaries? Were the 
years of reiterating the necessity to reduce state spending and business overheads all it took to 
clear the way for neoliberal ideologemes to worm their way into the various spheres of 
society – true to the neoliberal creed of decentralization? Why did the macroeconomic and 
political framework change in such a way as to foster the paradigm shift in very different 
nation-state economies? Why is it thought, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, at the 
national and international levels, that there is no alternative to free-market positions? Did 
neoliberalism experience its renaissance because it blazed a trail of historical inevitability, as 
numerous theorists of liberalism would claim? 
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Driving Forces: Crisis of Keynesianism, Flexibility and Apparent Modernity 
 
One obvious explanation why liberalism was able to return with such vehemence is the oil 
price shock of 1973 and the ensuing recession, the worst since the Great Depression, which 
led to stagflation, currency turbulence, a drastic drop in consumption and investment, 
worsening deficits in social security systems, and finally to a huge jump in unemployment 
rates. Growing functional deficiencies of Western economies accompanied by a deliberate 
discrediting of state interventions led to a delegitimation of Keynesianism.The traditional 
mechanisms of state action, including demand-side management, were increasingly regarded 
as inadequate. Here the “Waterloo of Keynesianism” (Willke 2003: 32) is sometimes 
explained in terms of the political actors finding themselves in a dilemma, at least 
subjectively, because of rampant stagflation: while raging inflation demanded a restrictive 
monetary policy on the part of the central banks, a situation of stagnating economic growth 
appeared to indicate state-initiated growth programmes. Under the assumption that restrictive 
monetary policy and expansive economic policy were mutually exclusive, the crucial political 
decision- makers declared that the Keynesian approach was stymied for that period – not least 
because the dilemma was interpreted primarily as a crisis of state control as a consequence of 
over-regulation. 
 
Another reason why neoliberalism was apparently able to achieve societal and cultural 
hegemony by stealth appears to lie in its adaptability and versatility: “There is nothing in the 
principles of liberalism to make it a stationary creed, there are no hard-and-fast rules fixed 
once and for all. The fundamental principle that in the ordering of our affairs we should make 
as much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible to 
coercion, is capable of an infinite variety of applications” (Hayek 2001: 17). This quote 
reveals that neoliberal positioning occurs not in the framework of a coherent, static body of 
theory, but latches as required into specific aspects of the life of society. Because 
neoliberalism deviates from rigid neoclassical model-based thinking, it is able to realign itself 
quickly and flexibly to fit with prevailing social and political constellations. This 
“universalism of particularisms” accounts for a large part of the success of neoliberal 
strategies (Walpen 2004: 277). In order to account for the pluralistic character of the term 
“neoliberalism” – i.e. the breadth of the neoliberal model “from the laissez-faire approach 
(anarcho-capitalism) to comprehensive state interventionism” – prominent authors speak of 
“neoliberalisms” (Walpen 2000: 1066–7). Following Bernhard Walpen and Ralf Ptak, who 
regard a sharp definition as a lost cause and emphasize the importance of a historical approach 
(Walpen 2004: 63; Ptak 2004b: 9–22), it must be noted that the term can only be understood 
in the context of its concrete, mostly country-specific origins. Interpreting neoliberalism as a 
“doctrine with many faces” (Pasche and Peters 1997: 205), is imperative if the popularity of 
neoliberal theories is to be understood. In order to dissolve this blurry terminology I suggest 
that we use the term ‘anti-statism’ instead to describe a mindset that is deeply rooted in 
general state skepticism.  
 
While analytical methods ranging from rational choice theory to game theory offer one 
approach to understanding the mechanisms that allowed core liberal demands to resurface in 
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new contextualized forms, another would be to consider the publications of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, probably the most influential network of anti-statism. Since its establishment in 1947 
this think tank has operated as a hothouse of neoliberal theory production – not least thanks to 
its star-studded cast of founding members including Walter Eucken, Milton Friedman, 
Ludwig von Mises, Michael Polanyi, Karl R. Popper, William E. Rappard, Wilhelm Röpke 
and Friedrich A. von Hayek. 
 
In the “Statement of Aims” formulated at the founding meeting we read that the 
representatives of this reconstituted liberalism wished for a “redefinition of the functions of 
the state” and “re-establishing the rule of law” (MPS 1947). The vagueness of the formulation 
that functioning competition, a free market and a guarantee of private property had to be the 
“indispensable foundations of economic prosperity and the bastion of a libertarian social 
order” (Meier-Rust 1993: 43) established a modicum of unity among the disparate “renewers 
of liberalism”, while the great bandwidth of the basic tenets permitted swift – even 
preemptive – responses as political developments unfolded (especially in the United States, 
Chile and Britain). Of course, an understanding that the term “liberal” – as stated in a note to 
the founding declaration – was used “in its European sense, broadly epitomized by a 
preference for minimal and dispersed government” (MPS 1947), left open a multitude of 
potential trajectories. All the founders agreed from the outset on the significance of liberty in 
society, as the conditio sine qua non of an efficient competition- based market, and also on the 
exclusivity of the neoliberal doxa and rejection of any form of collectivism: “Les participants 
seront tous des universitaires liés par le credo: moins d’Etat, peu d’Etat, mieux d’Etat; 
accomplissement de l’individu; contre la vocation messianique des masses, contre le 
keynesianisme et le marxisme” (Busino 1990: 214). 
 
These fundamentally conservative forces quickly adopted the insignia of modernity. Citing 
conventional economic explanations they discredited as outdated and thus obsolete political 
models that refused to make private economic criteria the yardstick for state activity. Those 
who continued to uphold social and civilizing achievements such as the right to free education 
now saw themselves painted as backward traditionalists refusing to abandon an antiquated 
political agenda. Pierre Bourdieu believes that the biggest factor behind the increased global 
acceptance of neoliberal dogma is that the curbing of the “visible hand” of the state appears in 
the guise of modernity: “This new type of conservative revolution appeals to progress, reason, 
and science to justify restoration and seeks in this way to dispatch progressive thought and 
action to an archaic past.” (2008: 288). 
 
 
Concepts of Universalizing the Market 
 
Ralf Ptak rightly notes that the “neoliberal ideology-formation” is to be interpreted as an 
“attempt to attain socio-cultural hegemony by stealth” (2004a: 23). But economization 
concepts based on privatization permeated the different spheres of society not just quietly and 
subtly, but mostly openly and brashly. Anti-statist concepts gained traction through the 
busting influence of think tanks on media, politics and business, given that there were “no 
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work and no authors to deal a death-blow to the old teachings to replace old pillars with new” 
(Flassbeck 1982: 75). Both Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) and Popper’s two-volume 
The Open Society and Its Enemies published a year later (1945) had an enormous and 
unforeseen impact on the field of social theory, but they did not bring about a paradigm 
change in economic, financial and social policy. 
 
The midwives of anti-statism were quick to recognize that effecting lasting change in the 
political culture would require a generous window of opportunity for the assertion of strategic 
influence. This assessment was also shared by Richard Cockett, who noted that the modus 
operandi of the Institute of Economic Affairs (founded in 1955 in Britain at Hayek’s 
initiative) meant “that they [the neoliberals] had to fight and win the intellectual battle over 
the course of twenty or more years without regard to the short-term political situation” (1995: 
139). 
 
Based as it is on classical liberalism and – at least in its origins and leanings – neoclassical 
theory, the economic policy of neoliberalism (and also its social philosophy) aims to 
minimize the influence of the state. The neoliberal discourse cherry-picks fundamental ideas 
from the classical liberalism of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, 
regurgitating them to fit the changed circumstances of the political economy. Unlike the “old” 
laissez-faire liberalism that emerged in opposition to protectionist mercantilism, neoliberalism 
regards economic interventions as necessary to ensure functioning markets, true to the spirit 
of “liberal interventionism” (Rüstow 1963: 253). 
 
With the goal of the broadest possible realization of the ideal of total competition intervention 
in the economy was now to be “in exactly the opposite direction, namely concurrent with the 
laws of the market rather than against them” (Rüstow 1963: 252–3). Rüstow, who taught at 
Istanbul University as a German exile from 1933 to 1949, is much more explicit in the 
immediately preceding passage: “The much-maligned Manchester capitalism has at least 
revealed a much more manly and courageous attitude than those whiners who immediately 
get the public authorities to stick the biggest possible plaster on the slightest scratch” (1963: 
251). Although from the 1960s neoliberal circles redoubled their efforts to coopt the term 
“liberalism” itself, the above quote shows that as a system of ideas neoliberalism was about 
more than a resurrection of traditional liberalism: namely, a fundamental realignment of 
social and economic policy. 
 
On the basis of the neoclassical equilibrium theory – developed in the last third of the 
nineteenth century out of classical economics – according to which the market possesses 
efficient incentive, control and penalty mechanisms, the supporters of the neoliberal turn 
argued for the primacy of the economy, for an economic policy of antistatism. Satisfying 
society’s needs through the market represents the be-all and end-all of neoliberal ideology put 
into practice, the central motto being “less government is good government” (Moore 1983: 
93). 
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Setting aside various sectoral, regional and historical variations, neoliberalism’s aim is 
“dethroning politics” (Bellamy 1994): competition and individualization through comprehen-
sive deregulation of the economic and social order, liberalization and privatization of public 
services and publicly owned businesses, tax cuts in tandem with cutting state spending, and 
restrictive monetary policy. “It is about pruning back excessive state regulation and reducing 
the crippling burdens on economic life. The insidious hypertrophism of the welfare state has 
laid a tangled web of rules, regulations and taxes over the economy like mildew. The 
neoliberal project aims to shape society and the economy in such a way that the individual’s 
‘striving for happiness’ can be realized with minimum state reglementation and maximum 
individual self-determination.” (Willke 2003: 21). Ultimately this means tying the states 
hand’s except where it serves to safeguard free-market mechanisms and the concomitant 
power relations. 
 
But how can the universality of the free-market principle be justified, the broad-brush fixation 
on the market as the central instance of coordination? Gary S. Becker, who won the 1992 
Swedish Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences (often referred to as a “Nobel prize” although 
it is awarded in memory of Alfred Nobel rather than by his foundation) formulated the 
benefits of the free-market principle in terms of its universal validity: “Indeed, I have come to 
the position that the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all 
human behavior, be it behavior involving money prices or imputed shadow prices, repeated or 
infrequent decisions, emotional or mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men or women, 
adults or children, brilliant or stupid persons, patients or therapists, businessmen or 
politicians, teachers or students” (1978: 8). The originators themselves described the uni-
versalization of the free market, expressed in the desire to apply cost/benefit considerations to 
all spheres of society, as “economic imperialism”(Boulding 1973: 118), strikingly high-
lighting the messianic dimension of this redefined liberalism. 
 
Charles E. Lindblom sees the superiority of the market over a system of central coordination 
grounded in the former’s evolutionary potential: “Market systems encourage thousands and 
millions of initiatives. They are turbulent, open-ended systems that can change or grow at any 
of innumerable points. They allow great room for invention and improvisation, individual and 
local resourcefulness, a multitude of challenges and potential responses” (1980: 77). Market 
economies are claimed to be extraordinarily adaptable evolutionary systems driven by 
competition as the central coordinating mechanism (Weizsäcker 2000: 2–3; Knieps 2000: 7–
22; Donges 2002: 7–11). 
 
The supporters of intense competition at all levels from individual to international claim that 
it solves the innovation problem by functioning as “abstract knowledge management” (Schui 
and Blankenburg 2002: 102); businesses competing with one another in pursuit of profit 
(which represents the result of a competitive advantage) drives technical progress, inducing 
growth, innovation and growing market share. Competitive structures are also regarded as 
significant in resolving motivation problems through the mechanism whereby performing 
adequately in the market earns companies’ profits whereas inefficiencies lead to losses and in 
the longer term elimination from the market. 
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The view that “the free market filters out the best methods and behaviour” (Schui and 
Blankenburg 2002: 101), is not restricted to competition between businesses, but also 
encompasses competition between nation-states (Standortwettbewerb). In short: competition 
functions as a regulatory principle acting to order and channel market forces. At the same 
time competition – in the opinion of those who regard it as the only driving force of general 
well-being apart from self-interest – can only express its ordering powers if it is managed and 
institutionally secured by the state.1 The market must not just be permitted but much more 
permanently facilitated. Ultimately, historical experience shows that the free play of market 
forces alone could not be expected to produce a market order of economic processes, but that 
instead the state had to guarantee the survival of competition on the field of competing 
interests as a “robust umpire” (Röpke 1979: 310) rather than just a “night-watchman” 
(Lassalle 1919: 195). 
 
 
Weighty Borrowings from Neoclassicism 
 
One central pillar of neoclassical economics – on which numerous neoliberal arguments are at 
least implicitly based – is the theory of equilibrium, according to which the market is 
automatically self-optimizing (i.e. its allocation function always tends towards equilibrium). 
Many representatives of the economic fraternity regard Adam Smith’s oft-quoted quasi- 
religious metaphor of the “invisible hand” as “perhaps the major intellectual discovery in the 
whole history of economics” (Buchanan 1986: 17). Here the metaphoric expression stands for 
the condition that is generally understood as the spontaneously price-controlled order of 
market events. 
 
Hayek’s implicit equilibrium of a market order that forms spontaneously of itself describes a 
market emerging as the coordinating instance by securing interaction of the economic 
subjects, regardless whether this is the labour, commodity or capital market (1969). Although 
Adam Smith’s striking image pertinently illustrates the way the coordinating effect of the 
market is often hidden from view, the theoretical concept of neoclassical economics has come 
in for criticism not only as a metaphorical exaggeration but even as a “gap in economic 
theory” tending towards “economic theology” (Baeker 2002: 610). 
 
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock responded to this criticism with an economics 
orientated on the “world as it is” rather than the “world as it should be”. Their public choice 
theory, which must be regarded as further evidence of the immense breadth of variation and 
versatility of neoliberal theory, became one of the most influential economic theories of the 
past century. The constitutive feature of the theory, also known as “new political economy”, 
is the application of the rational choice approach of neoclassical economics (which holds that 
the goal of maximizing utility determines individual decision-making calculations) to 
phenomena in the political sphere. 
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Buchanan’s academic reputation is grounded in his contribution to a “free-market 
reconception of the state” (Walpen 2004: 252), in the sense of a critique of the (welfare) state 
couched in terms of political economy; unlike most contemporary protagonists of a neoliberal 
turn, the thrust of his argument is not to attack nation-state socialism, but instead to make 
what liberal economists felt was the “mushrooming” welfare state the starting point of his 
critique, “Socialism Is Dead But Leviathan Lives On” (Buchanan, 1990). The award-winning 
economist declared the absence of free-market principles and the utility maximization of 
politicians to be the causes of state bureaucracy. Thus Ralf Dahrendorf’s call to banish “the 
talk of a good society” from the vocabulary of the social sciences because openness and 
liberty in a society were “absolutely adequate goals” (2000: 15) finds a broad echo among 
neoliberals. By contrast they regard any orientation on the common good as “preceptorially 
imposed virtuousness” (Willke 2003: 68). 
 
 
Idolizing Liberty and Absolutizing Market Mechanisms 
 
Although the term “neoliberalism” is occasionally used as a sledgehammer criticism of the 
economic developments of our age, this ideology does undoubtedly form the backdrop to 
modern capitalism. In the popular context neoliberalism is indeed sometimes referred to as 
“vulgar liberalism” because it overstates a lopsided version of liberty and treats coordinates 
maintained by the state with few exceptions as a kind of “institutional deprivation of liberty” 
(Roß 2000: 37–46). Its one-sided fixation on market freedom (cf. Friedman 1962) exposes it 
to the charge that it lacks moral and political substance. The financial markets of Latin 
America (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile) and the crises they have suffered since the 1990s 
are in a certain respect emblematic for such lapses of neoliberalism, which at its heart 
represents a modernized and radicalized variant of classical economic liberalism. But in other 
markets too, the crisis of the neoliberal project that emerged from the demise of Fordism 
produces failings that result from the one-sided orientation of a state that sees itself solely as 
the guarantor of national competitiveness. 
 
In the neoliberal understanding of politics the market represents a system of rules that 
excludes the application of categories such as justice and social acceptability (cf. Etzioni 
1988). In fact the costs of social inclusion are simply never set in relation to the costs that 
ensue – in the form of criminality, ghettoization, squalor, drug addiction, etc. – as a 
consequence of social turmoil and disparities. The historical roots of this short-sighted 
perspective are found in Hayek’s famous statement about the Keynesian welfare state: “A 
social market economy is not a market economy, a social constitutional state not a 
constitutional state, a social conscience not a conscience, social justice not justice and, I fear, 
social democracy not democracy” (1979: 16).2 Those who interpret the predicate “social” as a 
meaningless pleonasm or as a “weasel-word” (Hayek 1979: 16) and regard the free market as 
a moral concept consistently resist any subsequent correction of the results of the market, and 
especially any secondary redistribution to ease material inequalities. 
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However, the postulate that if the free market is to rule one must adapt to and fit in with it 
(Eucken 1952: 371) is subject to justified objections. Moderate and radical critics of 
deregulation and flexibilization remonstrate that the neoliberals are apologists for a new social 
Darwinism venerating the culture of “survival of the fittest”, and criticize both the 
rigorousness of the market and its anonymity. Whereas Richard Sennett, whose The 
Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism analyses 
global capitalism’s demands on its subjects, sees the “profit imperative” as the reason for 
capitalism to rid itself of all responsibility (1998), others criticize the return to Manchester 
capitalism as sheer “market fundamentalism” (Giddens 1990), even if some of them – 
including Anthony Giddens himself – are not immune to rearticulating neoliberal positions 
themselves. Critics from ethical communitarian currents complain of the lack of state 
institutions to provide a social counterweight to the market when they see “individuals as 
quivering atoms abandoned to the chill of neoliberalism” (Reese-Schäfer 2001: 131). Harsher 
criticism of the reformatting of liberalism – widely lauded as economia triumfans – comes 
from those who identify destructive elements with respect to the development of society 
above and beyond the points of criticism already mentioned. They castigate “capitalism 
unmasked” (Chomsky 1999: 9) with reference to a secularized religious doctrine, the 
neoliberal utopia as a kind of “infernal machine” (Bourdieu 2008: 28) or condemn the 
“delegitimization [of the welfare state] by liberal conservatism” (Butterwegge 1998: 70). 
Whether claiming that the market is inherently stable is the same as a “quasi-religious 
message of salvation” may be a moot point, but it serves to illustrate a persistent criticism 
(Zinn 2005: 2). It is generally believed that “there is no alternative” to the course of economic 
renewal “that sets social romanticism to one side” (Sinn and Sinn 1993: 485). Until the 
current economic and financial crisis erupted even prominent sceptics eked out a marginal 
existence without any meaningful media resonance. 
 
 
Discrediting and Eroding the (Welfare) State 
 
At the heart of anti-statist thought we find the idea of the state as a “boarder”, dismissing out 
of hand the tax revenues vital to funding the public sector as evidence of a state machinery 
colonizing society. But the postulated universality of this claim simply collapses under closer 
examination. True as it is that crowding-out effects and taxation of private wealth reduce the 
possibilities for private investment, the thesis that private spending is always more useful than 
public is equally untrue. In fact, private investment activity can only be assumed to be 
superior if it is exclusively compared to the “sovereign withdrawal” of private-sector value 
creation in the form of taxes (Hickel 1998: 152). But a proper verdict can only be reached if 
the consequences of public-sector activity are included in their totality. 
 
Largely ignoring the cultural, historical, institutional and geographical individualities of 
countries and regions, the neoliberal strategy aims to cleanse capitalism of a vast variety of 
social and welfare state impurities. Such a way of looking at things ignores decisive facets of 
the economic system that have matured over decades, sometimes centuries, into stabilizers of 
social, fiscal, environmental and transport policy. This reduction of complexity is one crucial 
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reason why the neoliberal perspective has found great resonance outside of academic debate 
and the scientific community. This simplification materializes for example in the offhand 
rejection of “state activity” (with all its immensely complex ramifications) in favour of a 
fundamental belief in the superiority of free-market principles in all spheres of the economy. 
Here the free market is elevated to mythical status and various exchange theories to the 
political ideal, even though the majority of the economic fraternity has long rejected the 
reduction of political economy to catallactics, or the theory of exchanges. 
 
The mathematical fiction of neoclassical economic theory manifests itself in its recourse to 
“colossal abstraction” in the general theory of equilibrium (Bourdieu 1998): “Liberal 
economics had floated away into a kind of intellectual Disneyland inhabited by a multitude of 
industrious dwarfs, happily hammering away at their anvils and humming over their money 
bags, apparently untaxed, unexploited – and untempted by lust, avarice or power. Every story 
had a happy ending as it usually had only one character” (Staniland 1985: 77–8). 
 
Now that the erosion of the welfare state has fulfilled the expectations of the anti-statists that 
the harsh realities of an increasingly globalized world will lead to a return to the wobbly 
pillars of the “pure” market economy, free-market principles appear to have been immunized 
against any kind of moral, ethical or political questioning. Neoliberal critics of the welfare 
state deliberately confuse cause and effect when they declare the “overstretched” welfare state 
to be the cause of crisis. In fact exactly the opposite causality can be demonstrated: Economic 
and employment crisis undermined the foundations of the social security system. As the 
number of people who still had work or training fell and the pressure on their level of wages 
or income grew, contributions to the social insurance schemes fell, while significantly greater 
numbers had to make more use of the promises of benefits (and more often). 
 
The origins of this development are to be found in the neoliberal transmutation of the idea of 
justice, where the danger of abuse of the welfare system (moral hazard) was systematically 
promulgated. The previously proclaimed concept of need-based redistributional justice was 
supplanted by an idea of “equality of opportunity” based on personal initiative and self-help 
and the turn to an intergenerational concept of justice (“generational justice”). Working from 
the assumption that free-market mechanisms would implicitly take care of aspects of justice, 
prominent social democratic political theorists pressed for the idea of equality to be revised. 
Among their number was Anthony Giddens, until 2003 director of the London School of 
Economics and Political Science and long-serving advisor to British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. According to his view the contemporary left needs to develop a dynamic, life-chances 
approach to equality, placing the prime stress on equality of opportunity (2000: 85).3 
 
Any concept of equality that manifests itself in the glorification of free competition and the 
perspective that “inequality is not regrettable, but highly welcome” (Hayek 1981: 38) would 
appear to be practically irreconcilable with the welfare state clauses found in many European 
constitutions. Those who are pushing forward the destruction of the welfare state under the 
pretence of reform fail to recognize that the welfare state, by defusing social contradictions, 
has made a decisive contribution to internal security and social peace and must ultimately be 
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regarded as the foundation of prosperity. 
 
Granted, the authors of the neoliberal agenda were often setting out to write pithy and simply 
formulated statements. Indeed, the fundamentally positive comprehensibility of the theses 
often stems from the way the object of economic analysis is systematically expanded until all 
facets of human activity are simply a question of allocation of scarce resources. For example 
the expanded influence of economic principles subsumes the political and administrative 
system under market categories, only to reject it as absolutely inefficient. This way of looking 
at things results from the reduction of the individual to a rational economic decision-maker, 
who makes choices about family, relationships and career largely or even exclusively on the 
basis of cost/benefit considerations. 
 
Already at the beginning of the twentieth century Hans Honegger – addressing Max Weber’s 
political economy – pointed out that attempts to order all aspects of society through the model 
of the market were misguided, even claiming that: “the economy is fundamentally rooted in 
politics, through which it must ultimately be explained” (1925: 135). And even in the writings 
of ordoliberal Wilhelm Röpke – who called at the founding meeting of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society in April 1947 for an economic order of “economic humanism” – we find an early hint 
of the criticism associated to this day with the (sometimes overused) concept of 
neoliberalism: “We know well enough that it would be foolish to suppose competition, the 
free market and the interplay of supply and demand to be mechanisms from which we can 
expect the best in all spheres under all circumstances. This general notion – which no-one 
should take more to heart than the friend of the free-market economy – leads us to the specific 
recognition that the market one-sidedly favours activity that is the source of profit, while 
arguments against such activity are disregarded in the market even though the general interest 
demands they should be given the greatest weight. This makes the market incompetent for the 
really important decisions” (1979: 200). 
 
With the financial crisis triggered by the American subprime mortgage collapse leaving skid 
marks in growth and employment across the globe, it is time to stop worshipping the market 
and cease damning the state as an exploitative Leviathan. The great shake-out in the global 
financial casino simply demonstrates that global networking has made free markets much 
more volatile and therefore much more susceptible to crisis. The worst economic dislocation 
since the Great Crash of 1929-30 is a time to rethink the relationship between the state and the 
economy – and here or there readjust – after first setting aside the neoliberal philosophy of 
destatification. The neoliberal battle-cry since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, 
that the state must withdraw from the commanding heights of the economy, is heard no more. 
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Notes 
 
1. Leonhard Miksch, an early proponent of German neoliberalism, described the free-market 
economy as a “Veranstaltung”, because the state appeared as an ordering instance to 
guarantee the functioning of competition (1937: 5 and 9). 
 
2. While many observers regard Germany’s Social Market Economy as a highly ambitious 
and extremely successful (“economic miracle”) blueprint for a coordinated economy cum 
welfare state, the original conception was in fact designed in opposition to Keynesian and 
other ideas in favor of extensive state planning for economic and social purposes. At the same 
time the neoliberal founding fathers critiqued classical laisser faire liberalism in order to 
create considerable room for maneuvers needed to cut political deals with a strong socialist 
and trade union opposition in post WW II Germany. 
 
3. In this context Giddens points out that social democrats must not only revise their approach 
to, but also their concept of, equality in the wake of the decline of socialism. From his point 
of view there is no future for the “egalitarianism at all costs” that absorbed leftists for so long. 
He quotes Michael Walzer that “simple equality of that sort is the bad utopianism of the old 
left” (2000: 85). 
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